Introduction
The recent financial crisis started in the subprime market soon spread to the prime and commercial markets.
1 While numerous studies have been conducted on the default of subprime residential mortgages, little has been done on commercial mortgages. 2 In this paper, we examine experienced exceptional "good time". Meanwhile, a number of recent studies have found reduced underwriting has contributed to the catastrophic default loss in the residential mortgage market and that the expansion of the securitization market has caused the lax underwriting (see, e.g. Mian and Sufi 2009 , Elul 2009 , Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig 2010 and Rajan, Seru and Vig 2010 . 3 Given that the CMBS and the commercial real estate CDO markets have experienced booms similar to that in the prime MBS and the subprime ABS markets, it is natural to ask whether intensified securitization similarly has caused lax underwriting in the commercial mortgage market that causes high default rates.
Property price decline and the resulting negative equity is undoubtedly a critical driver of residential mortgage default (see, e.g. Deng, Quigley, Van Order, 2000; Demyanyk and Hemert, 2009 ). Similar to the unprecedented downturn in the residential market, commercial real estate prices have declined by 44 percent from the peek in October 2007 to the trough in October 2009
(figure 1). Therefore, we investigate the relation between property value depreciation and CMBS loan default. In addition, we examine the relation between CMBS default and commercial property NOI growth, as insolvency is another significant trigger of commercial mortgage default (see, e.g. Goldberg and Capone, 2002; Seslen and Wheaton, 2010) . In the study of the aforementioned two drivers of CMBS loan default, we pay special attention to two issues: one is the potential lag of the impacts of negative equity and negative cash flow on default; the other is the possible structural beak in the mortgage market after the unprecedented real estate market crisis. 3 It is important to observe that there is a difference between reduced underwriting standards and misleading underwriting standards. In a market where property values are increasing and delinquency rates are falling, procyclical underwriting would be the increase of loan-to-value ratios, interest-only loans and loan documentation. This is different than underwriting standards being substantially below what was promised.
We find that the default rates of conduit CMBS loans, including the 30+, 60+, and 90+ delinquency rates all have risen sharply since late 2008 and have reached 8.63%, 6.32% and 5.73%, respectively, in the second quarter of 2010. The 2010Q2 default rates are about 7 times of the 10-year average. On a longer horizon, the recent wave of CMBS loan default at the start of the crisis were low compared to historical default rate levels but they accelerated very quickly during the crisis and became much higher than those in the 1990-1992 commercial real estate recession. We also find that default rates of CMBS loans are cyclical. The analysis in the paper provides a first step towards a better understanding of the time series dynamics of commercial mortgage default risk and potential credit cycles in the mortgage market.
Cross sectional comparisons show that default rate conduit CMBS loans is lower than those of commercial mortgages held by banks and thrifts during the crisis but has surpassed the latter recently. However, default rate of conduit CMBS loans in the past 10 years has always been higher than those of the commercial mortgage loans held by life insurance companies and multifamily mortgages securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The serious delinquency rate of conduit CMBS loans is comparable to that of the prime conventional FRMs, and is about one third of that of prime conventional ARMs, about one fifth of that of subprime FRMs and nearly one eighth of that of subprime ARMs.
Based on information from surveys of loan officers and investors, as well as origination weighted average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) contained in CMBS pools, we find limited evidence of eased underwriting of CMBS loans prior to the crisis, which is consistent with findings in Stanton and Wallace (2010) . However, this finding does not preclude the possibility that underwriting of CMBS loans before the crisis are based on inflated property value and thus there is virtually deterioration in underwriting standards.
We further confirm the significant negative relations between CMBS loan default and property value appreciation and NOI growth, predicted by a double trigger default model. Interestingly, through a simple regression exercise we discover that property price change affects default with a 4-quarter lag and change in NOI affects default with a 1-quarter lag, consistent with behavioral conjectures regarding commercial mortgage default. This provides implications for proactive default mitigation through special loan services. We also find a structural break of the relation between property value change and CMBS loan default in the start of the crisis, with CMBS borrowers respond more sensitively to property value decline during the crisis. This is consistent with findings in An, Deng, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2010) about asymmetric relations between mortgage default and property price movement in an up and a down market. However, the relation between CMBS loan default and NOI growth remains stable throughout the commercial real estate cycle.
We proceed as follows: in the next section, we document the time series dynamics of default rates of CMBS loans and compare them with those of other mortgage market segments; in section 3, we present a double trigger theoretical framework for default analysis, and investigate how changes in underwriting and property market conditions have caused elevated CMBS loan default; we provide conclusions and discussions in the final section.
Default Rate of CMBS Loans
Similar to residential mortgage loans, late fees will be charged if a CMBS loan is 30-day delinquent. When a CMBS loan is 60-day overdue, a notice of default is usually sent to the borrower and the servicing of the loan will be transferred from the primary servicer to a special servicer, who will first seek to workout the loan if appropriate. If a workout is unsuccessful, the lender (through special servicer) will start the foreclosure process, which typically occurs after the loan is over 90-day delinquent and can result in trustee sale, short sale, or REO (unsuccessful trustee sale). Therefore, 30-day delinquency, 60-day delinquency and 90-day delinquency are critical events in the life of a CMBS loan and represent certain risks of default loss to lenders and investors. In the following, we document default rates based on three different definitions: 30+ delinquency includes 30-to 59-day delinquency, 60-to 89-day delinquency, 90-day and over delinquency, performing and nonperforming post balloon, foreclosure, and REO; 60+ delinquency includes all above except 30-to 59-day delinquency; and 90+ delinquency means the loan is either 90-day and plus delinquent, or in foreclosure, or REO.
Time Series Dynamics of CMBS Loan Default Rate
How default risk changes over time is a crucial topic for portfolio managers who care more about systematic risk than idiosyncratic risk and for financial regulators who are interested in the stability of the whole financial system. Therefore, a sizable literature has been developed in the past ten years on the time series dynamics of corporate default (see, e.g., Nickell, Perraudin, Varotto, 2000; Allen and Saunders, 2003; Pesaran, et al, 2003; Koopman, Lucas, Klaassen, 2005; Lown and Morgan, 2004; Koopman, Lucas, Daniels, 2005; Duffie, Saita, Wang, 2007) . 4 We take a first step toward that direction by documenting the changes in CMBS loan default rates over time.
In Figure 2 , we present the 30+, 60+, and 90+ delinquency rates of conduit CMBS loans from the first quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2010. Note that we focus on conduit CMBS loans as conduit deals are the dominant type of CMBS deals and CMBS loans originated by conduits represent the "standard" CMBS loans. Figure 1 , although there seems to be a lag between CMBS loan default and property value decline. We will revisit this issue later in the paper.
In Table 1 , we present a matrix that breaks down the serous (90+) delinquency rate by loan vintage and duration. For example, the first row shows the serious delinquency rate of conduit CMBS loans originated in 1999 at age 0 through age 10. Thus the numbers on the diagonal of the We also compare default rates of commercial mortgage loans during the two commercial real estate cycles in Figure 3 . The default rates are calculated based on Table 1 and Table 2 , and the shaded areas indicate the two recessions, which are 1990-1992 and 2007-2009 . An important finding is that the serious delinquency rates are much lower at the start of the recent recession compared to the one in the 1990s, but they have accelerated much more rapidly. We observe cyclicality of commercial mortgage default rates in both cycles.
Cross Sectional Comparisons
The CMBS market emerged as a "kitchen sink" for bad commercial mortgage loans as securitization in the early 1990s is mainly for the purpose of liquidating nonperforming commercial mortgage loan portfolios of failed thrifts (Geltner, Miller, Clayton, Eichholtz, 2007) .
However, in the past 10 years, the CMBS market has become the dominant funding source for commercial real estate, and is thought to have brought uniform underwriting standards, transparency, and efficiency gains to the commercial mortgage market (An, Deng, Gabriel, 2009 ).
In light of the recent crisis, there are rising concerns of the moral hazard in the "originate-todistribute" model of mortgage lending and the performance of conduit loans (An, Deng, Gabriel, 2010) . Therefore, it is interesting to compare the default rates of conduit CMBS loans with those of loans of other lending channels or investor types.
In Figure 4 , we compare the serious delinquency rate of conduit CMBS loans with that of the Finally, it is interesting to see a comparison of the default rates in the commercial mortgage market with those in the residential mortgage market. Figure 6 presents such a comparison.
Before the crisis, the serious delinquency rate of conduit CMBS loans is in line with that of prime conventional mortgages, both fixed rate and adjustable rate. Starting from late 2006, there is a big divergence of prime conventional ARM default rate from prime conventional FRM default rate. Since then, the conduit CMBS default rate has been significantly lower than that of prime conventional FRMs, until it surpassed the latter in the fourth quarter of 2009. Over the 10-year period, the average serious delinquency rate of conduit CMBS loans is comparable to the average serious delinquency rate of prime conventional FRMs (2.62% vs. 2.44%). Over the entire period, conduit CMBS loan default rate is remarkably lower than those of subprime FRMs and subprime ARMs. The 10-year average serious delinquency rate of conduit CMBS loans is about one fifth of that of subprime FRMs and nearly one eighth of that of subprime ARMs.
Drivers of CMBS Loan Default

The Theoretical Framework
We follow existing studies such as Goldberg and Capone (2002) Without market frictions such as transaction cost and short selling constraints, a rational commercial mortgage borrower will default his loan when the net operating income of the collateral (property) is not enough to cover his debt payment (insolvency) and the property value is lower than the market value of the mortgage loan (negative equity). We stress the simultaneity of the insolvency and negative equity as conditions of commercial mortgage default because if the borrower is insolvent but has positive equity he can sell the property and pay off the mortgage loan, and vice versa, if the borrower has negative equity but is solvent he would prefer to keep the loan and receive positive cash flows. 
The default probability of the commercial mortgage loan is thus:
7 Even a balloon default with similar situation can be avoided with short selling. 
The implications of the these comparative statics include: deteriorating underwriting standards can subsequently lead to elevated default rate as the lower the DSCR or the higher the LTV at loan origination, the higher the default risk of commercial mortgage loans. Furthermore, 8 For the majority of commercial mortgage loans, the payment is fixed, i.e. 1
difficulties in the commercial property market such as worsening NOI and declining property value will be transformed into increased default rate of commercial mortgage loans.
CMBS Loan Underwriting and Default
Berger and Udell (2002) Additionally, we study the property type composition of conduit CMBS loan collaterals, which is plotted in Figure 13 . Consistent with that of the LTV and DSCR plots in Figure 10 and Figure Finally, we look at the percentage of CMBS deals that are composed of single-borrower loans or floating rate loans. Those two types of CMBS loans (deals) are usually seen as having high risk.
However, we find no evidence of CMBS issuers putting more of those higher risk loans into the CMBS market during the high securitization years (2005) (2006) (2007) . We do see the CMBS issuers putting minimal level of floating rate loans into CMBS deals starting from 2008, possibly due to the astonishing high default rates of ARMs seen in the residential mortgage market.
Based on the above analysis, we find limited evidence of lax underwriting in CMBS loans before the crisis. This is consistent with findings in Stanton and Wallace (2010) that loans underlying CMBS did not significantly change their characteristics during 1996-2008. However, it is noteworthy that our analysis on underwriting is based on very limited information. A more detailed analysis is needed to reach a firm conclusion. For example, it will be helpful if we know the percentage of loans (loan months) with interest only (IO) periods. Moreover, our findings here does not preclude the possibility that underwriting of CMBS loans prior to the crisis are based on inflated property value and thus constitute a real deterioration in standards. Finally, commercial lenders may have changed their underwriting standards in an unperceivable way as argued in Rajan, Seru and Vig (2010) .
Property Value, NOI, and CMBS Loan Default
House price decline and the resulting negative equity is undoubtedly a critical driver of the recent subprime mortgage market crisis (Sanders, 2008; Demyanyk and Hemert, 2009 ). Our analysis in section 3.1 further suggests that negative cash flow and insolvency is another driver of commercial mortgage default. When the commercial property NOI is not enough to cover the mortgage payment, the likelihood of a default increases substantially.
In studying the relations between CMBS loan default and changes in property value and NOI, we pay special attention to the following two issues. First, there tends to be a lag between property value decline (or decrease in NOI) and mortgage default. On one hand, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) find that many borrowers will consider to default their mortgage loans only after they have over 10% of negative equity. On the other hand, as stressed in our theoretical analysis in section 3.1, insolvency and negative equity are joint conditions of commercial mortgage default. If the borrower has negative equity but is solvent he would prefer to keep the loan and receive positive cash flows, which includes the "extend and pretend" strategy some borrower employ when they have difficulty refinance their loans and thus face balloon default. Similarly, if the borrower is insolvent he will take time to try to sell his property to pay off the mortgage loan until the property sale is not feasible.
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Second, given the unprecedented collapse of the housing and commercial property markets, there may be a structural break in the mortgage market. Sanders (2008) In Table 4 and Table 5 , we present results of simple regressions of 30+ delinquency rate on changes in property value or NOI. In those regressions, we pool the time series of quarterly default rate of the four property types together and obtain corresponding change in property value or NOI measures from NCREIF. We experiment with the number of quarter lags in the explanatory variable to find the best fitting. From these two tables, we confirm the negative relations between CMBS loan default and property value (NOI) change we see in the Figures 14-21. Furthermore, we find the 4-quarter lag in property value change has the highest explanatory power on CMBS loan default while 1-quarter lag in NOI growth provides the highest fit.
In Table 6 , we enter change in property value and NOI growth into the regression at the same time, following our double trigger default framework. We use the optimal lags in the explanatory variables we identify in Tables 4 and 5 . In model 11, we see both property value change and NOI growth have negative impacts on CMBS loan default, although the coefficient of NOI growth is marginally significant. In model 12, we allow a structural break in the relations between default and changes in property value and NOI. We interact the two explanatory variables in model 11 However, the relation between default and NOI growth remain stable over the entire [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] period. Finally, we notice that the model with structural break has the highest fitting among the 12 models we present in Table 4 -6.
Conclusions and Discussions
Default loss and default risk of CMBS loans have been and will remain major concerns of investors, lenders, servicers, CMBS rating agencies as well as financial regulators who are concerned with big financial institutions' involvement in CMBS loan originations and investments.
In this paper, we document the default rates of CMBS loans during the current crisis. We find that the default rates of conduit CMBS loans, including the 30+, 60+, and 90+ delinquency rates all have risen sharply since late 2008 and have reached levels that are about 7 times of the 10-year average. We also compare the CMBS loan default rates in the recent crisis with those in commercial real estate market crisis in the early 1990s, and find that default rates of CMBS loans at the start of the current crisis were low compared to historical default rate levels but they accelerated rapidly during the crisis and became much higher than those in the 1990-1992
recession. Cross sectional comparisons show that conduit CMBS default rate is similar to the default rate of commercial mortgage loans held by banks & thrifts. However, the default rate of conduit CMBS loans in the past 10 years has always been higher than those of the commercial mortgage loans held by life insurance companies and multifamily mortgages securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We also find conduit CMBS loan default rate is comparable to that of prime conventional FRMs. Over the entire 2000-2010 period, conduit CMBS loan default rate is remarkably lower than those of subprime FRMs and subprime ARMs.
We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis. We confirm that commercial property value decline is an important driver of the elevated CMBS loan default during the crisis and deteriorating cash flows of underlying properties add to the problems. Furthermore, we discover that property value change has a 4 quarter lag in its impact on CMBS loan default and that NOI growth has a 1-quarter lag in its impact. Finally, we find a structural break in the relation between property value change and CMBS loan default starting from 2007Q4 but the relation between CMBS loan default and NOI growth remains stable over the entire 2000-2010 period.
Needless to say, better information is needed. In future research, loan level information on CMBS default will greatly sharpen our analysis if such data becomes available. 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Serious ( 
